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In this paper, we develop a sociomaterial perspectiv  for appreciating tensions between different 
technological regimes in digital innovation. Our case study research specifically looks at the 
tension between the deep-rooted component-based logic of two automakers’ innovation practices 
and their attempt to introduce a new software architecture based on service orientation. Our 
evidence suggests that digital architectures need to materialize and be shaped in a dialectical way 
in the mangle of both existing regimes. We argue that t e threesome dance of physical material 
agency, digital material agency and human agency can explain this finding and yield implications 
for our understanding of digital innovation in the traditional industries. Digital innovation is a 
result of a dialectical process, resolving various elements of resistance, subjection, and 
accommodation across the three types of agency. 
Keywords:  Innovation, Sociomateriality, Service oriented architecture (SOA), Software 
architecture, Software platform 
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Introduction  
Computing and networking capabilities are of increasing importance to product innovation in industries such as 
avionics, automotive, and consumer electronics. This importance is not only manifested in increasing spending on 
digital technology over the last 20 years but also in the emergence of new business concepts turning physical 
products into digital products and services (Andersson et al. 2008; Barabba et al. 2002; Jonsson et al. 2008). The 
digitization of products, what we refer to as digital innovation in this paper, creates new waves of organizational, 
technical and cognitive challenges in organizations (Yoo et al. 2008). 
In particular, the digitization of physical products entails inherent tensions between a long-established 
manufacturing paradigm that is hardware-based and an emerging software logic that is service-based (Andreasson 
and Henfridsson 2009). We trace these tensions to the co-existence of two heterogeneous innovation regimes 
(Godoe 2000) with different social structures and technical materiality (Orlikowski and Scott 2008, Pickering 1993). 
On one hand, the manufacturing paradigm is characterized by an innovation regime centered on component-based 
modularity (Garud et al. 2003). With physical components as a material basis, modularity has proved useful in the 
design of complex systems, such as cars or airplanes, by establishing interdependence within and independence 
across product components (Baldwin and Clark 1997; Ulrich 1995). Furthermore, it provides a template with which 
social structures with suppliers and sub-contractors are established. It further facilitates specialization and division 
of expertise in a hierarchical way. Such hierarchical control, combined with modular design principles, facilitates 
flexible coordination of loosely coupled business and sourcing relations (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996). To the 
contrary, service-based modularity is an innovation regime that seeks to unbundle software modules from physical 
constraints by promoting architectures that are independent from specific platforms (Allen 2006). Drawing on the 
materiality of software-based computing and communication capability (Zammuto et al. 2007), service-based 
modularity facilitates new forms of social structures based on coordination among distributed and heterogeneous 
actors. Generic platforms and reduced communication c sts allow for integration of previously unconnected 
activities and artifacts (Yoo et al. 2008), tapping to a new source of creativity in product design (Yoffie 1997; 
Zittrain 2006). Together, computing and communication opens up for radical “reconfigurations of an established 
system to link together existing components in a new way” (Henderson and Clark 1990).  
In this paper, we examine the tension between component-based modularity and service-based modularity s an 
important consequence of digital innovation in the ar a of car infotainment system. Appreciating that innovation 
regimes would not be developed, maintained, or modified without social practices (Godoe 2000; Nelson and Winter 
1982), our analysis is geared towards the way that this tension plays out in the social practice of product developing 
firms. In doing so, we draw on a sociomateriality perspective (Orlikowski 2007; Orlikowski and Scott 2008, 
Pickering 1993) for analyzing the adoption of service-based modularity into innovation practices characterized by 
component-based modularity. A sociomateriality persctive enables us to see innovation as a continuing dialectic 
process through resistance and accommodation, i.e., a mangling process. In extant research, sociomateriality lenses 
have been employed to study the introduction of single technologies (Orlikwoski 2007, Pickering 1993, 1995). Our 
work extends earlier literature on sociomateriality by examining the tension between the two different materiality 
regimes and their interplay with human agencies as digitization of products unfolds. In addition, we note that 
digitization do not lead to a replacement of one regime for another. After all, despite increasing digital content, 
products such as cars, airplanes, and household appiances will always consist of physical parts. In other words, 
digital innovation entails the co-existence of dual sociomaterial practices, forming an emerging configuration of 
sociomateriality blurring the boundary between the p ysical and the digital. 
We conducted case study research (Yin 2009) at two aut makers, CarCorp and AutoInc, where a new service-based 
architecture, MOST (Media Oriented Systems Transport), was introduced to facilitate digital innovation in the area 
of infotainment systems. Through data collection methods such as semi-structured interviews, participant 
observations, thematic workshops, and document analysis, we explored how these two innovation regimes w re 
clashing in the dynamics of sociomaterial practice of product innovations. Our study illustrates how the design 
vision, grounded in service-based modularity, confrted persistent resistance, grounded in the existing 
sociomateriality of component-based modularity, and how designers had to accommodate the materiality of 
hardware components throughout the design process. To resolve such tensions, software engineers had to set their 
visions of service-orientation aside, and find soluti ns that reasonably aligned with the dominant, comp nent-based 
modularity. Dialectics between resistance and accomm dation, then, is at the core of continuing evoluti n of digital 
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innovations which emerge out of impure dynamics of mangling of two different forms of materiality and human 
agency (Pickering 1993). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of component-based 
modularity and service-oriented computing as two competing innovation regimes. Then, we present sociomateriality 
as a theoretical lens with which we analyze the dynamics of sociomaterial practice in manufacturing. We then 
outline our research methodology, followed by a presentation of our case study of MOST in the automotive industry. 
Finally, we discuss some theoretical implications of the case study. 
Tensions in Innovation Regimes 
We refer to digital innovation as the new waves of organizational, technical, and cognitive innovation practices that 
follow the digitization of physical artifacts (cf. Andersson et al. 2008; Boland et al. 2007; Henfridsson et al. 2009; 
Yoo et al. 2008; Zammuto et al. 2007). In this regad, digital innovation can be positioned at the intersection of the 
technology management literature (e.g., Baldwin andClark 2000; Garud et al. 2003; Henderson and Clark 1990; 
Murmann and Frenken 2006) and the IT innovation literature (e.g., Fichman 2004; Lyytinen and Rose 2003; 
Swanson 1994; Swanson and Ramillier 2004). This emerging research stream strikes a useful balance between the 
physical and the digital in approaching innovation.  
To this end, this section briefly describes component-based and service-based computing as innovation regimes. 
Godoe (2000) defines innovation regimes as “principles, norms and ideology, rules and decision-making procedures 
forming actors’ expectations and actions in terms of the future development of a technology” (p. 1034). In this 
study, we see an innovation regime as an example of mangling process as it entails the materiality of technology 
being developed and the social practices in the devlopment process.  Following this focus on innovation regimes, 
our examination of these two forms of modularity is not intended to be exhaustive but to provide a basis for 
appreciating their underlying assumptions and influence on the product innovation process. 
Component-Based Modularity 
Product architecture is imperative to firms operating in competitive markets. Accordingly, the innovation literature 
has paid a lot of attention to different architecture types and their specific firm implications (see e.g., Baldwin and 
Clark 1997; Ulrich 1995; Ulrich and Eppinger 2003). One of the most influential architectures in manufcturing is 
component-based modularity (Garud et al. 2003).   
Modularity has proved useful in the design of complex systems. In particular, it establishes interdependence within 
and independence across product components (Baldwin and Clark 1997; Ulrich 1995). It facilitates control over 
complex systems, allowing for concurrent design, and ccommodates uncertainty (Baldwin and Clark 2000; Parnas 
1972). In this vein, modular design facilitates product change and flexibility (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996), allowing 
incremental improvement of the product design over time. In addition, a modular product architecture constitutes a 
template with which social relationships with suppliers and sub-contractors can be enacted. It facilittes 
specialization and division of expertise in a hierarchical way. Such hierarchical control, combined with modular 
design principles, facilitates flexible coordination f loosely coupled business and sourcing relations (Sanchez and 
Mahoney 1996). Consequently, manufacturing firms use component-based modularity to establish horizontal loose 
coupling between components and vertical tight integration of the product design hierarchy. While compnents, and 
their inherent functionality, are managed autonomously by suppliers, system integration is strictly contr lled by the 
manufacturer. 
Enabled by component-based modularity, innovation processes typically follow a linear logic powered by waterfall 
models of product development (Boehm 1976; Royce 1970). Requirements are therefore gradually broken down 
according to the design hierarchy, reflecting a distributed nature of innovation. Business objectives, overall system 
topics, and significant functional properties, are managed by the manufacturer, while the design of components and 
detailed functionality is assigned to highly autonomous suppliers further down the hierarchy. While thse remote 
”islands of innovation” are in a subordinate positin, it is clear that product-lead firms are highly reliant on their 
long-term generative capacity for securing competitiv ness over time. 
Human Behavior and IT 
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Service-Oriented Modularity 
While component-based modularity has its basis in physical components, the unit of innovation in service-oriented 
computing is the software service. Such services ar self-describing, open components that support rapid nd low-
cost composition of distributed applications (Papazoglou and Georgakopolous 2003). Rather than focusing o  
controlling the innovation process through decomposition, the main emphasis of service-oriented computing is 
agility. Service-oriented computing is frequently portrayed as a response to modern organizations’ needs of speed, 
cost-effectiveness, accuracy, and flexibility when dealing with ever-changing demands (Allen 2006).  
With agility as a value basis, the service-oriented innovation regime views a service, or a module, as a temporary 
solution that is scrutinized to continuous reassessm nt within a non-linear and relatively open innovation network. 
The service is a reusable unit of business-complete work (Papazoglou and van den Heuvel 2007) and its ultimate 
prosperity is determined by its ability to provide user value. Because of their relative independence of physical 
constraints, software services can be easily recombined to deliver new functionality and user value. In this regard, a 
service-oriented innovation regime enables sense-and-respond capability, releasing firms from the burden of 
predicting services of tomorrow. Achieving such agility requires a service-oriented architecture (SOA) that aligns 
technology with business goals (Allen 2006). 
Two fundamental elements of SOA can be distinguished: structure and policy (Allen 2006). With service orientation 
the dominant structure is manifested in software, rather than hardware. Functionality is implemented as loosely-
coupled software services, relatively independent from the underlying hardware and operating system. Important 
structural concepts of SOA are encapsulation, abstrction, reusability, composability (several services can be 
combined), autonomy and granulation (the service show functionality at a granularity recognized by the user). 
Largely, the structural principles of SOA are inherited from earlier paradigms, such as object-oriented d sign 
(Mathiassen et al. 2000) and component-based software engineering (Heineman and Councill 2001), but we also 
recognize many concepts from component-based modularity.  
As pointed out by Huhns and Singh (2005), SOA also depends on how well services can be placed into a chesive 
framework. In contrast to component-based modularity, where product design and organizational design are tightly 
inter-related (Sosa et al. 2004), service-oriented computing devises software policy to control the distributed 
computing environment. Such policy covers issues such as quality of service, design, sourcing and usage, nd 
technology. For instance, sourcing policy concerns the way that services should be purchased and supplied. 
Important issues include whether services should be insourced or outsourced.  
Sociomateriality 
While the innovation regimes of component-based modularity and service-oriented computing are inherently 
different forms of modularity, physical products with embedded computing and communication capability cannot 
escape either of them. A significant challenge in digital innovation is, then, to explicate the co-existence of these two 
different forms of sociomateriality. As noted above, materiality of technology alone does not determine the fate of 
innovations. In addition to different material basis (physical components and software), different innovation regimes 
are characterized by different social structures that include heterogeneous norms and values that play out differently 
in innovation practices enacted by actors in the innovation process. These social structures are continuously 
reshaped through the interplay with technical materi lity, forming the mangle of sociomateriality that underpins an 
innovation regime.  
In order to understand the adoption of service-based modularity into innovation regimes characterized by 
component-based modularity, we therefore turn to the literature on sociomateriality (Orlikowski 2007; Orlikowski 
and Scott 2008). The sociomateriality perspective is a useful way of conceptualizing the interplay between human 
agency and material agency in organizational life. In particular, we pick up three interrelated concepts within this 
relatively broad body of literature. First, we have adopted the idea of sociomaterial assemblages. In synthesizing a 
stream of research dealing with the mutual interdependence between social and technical elements (see e.g., Barley 
1988; Orlikowski 1992, 2000; Monteiro and Hanseth 1995; Rose et al. 2005) this concept underlines the constitutive 
entanglement of material and human agency. Drawing on new perspectives on agency in sociology, such as Actor-
Network Theory (Callon 1986; Latour 1987), socio-technical ensembles (Bijker 1995), mangle of practice 
(Pickering 1995), relational materiality (Law 2004), and IS researchers’ conceptualizing of the mutual entanglement 
of technology and human action (Jones 1998; Kallinikos 2006; Latham and Sassen 2005; Monteiro and Hanseth 
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1995; Orlikowski 2007; Orlikowski and Iacono 2001; Orlikowski and Scott 2008), the sociomaterial perspctive 
opposes the ontological separation between people and technology as primarily self-contained entities hat influence 
each other (Slife 2004). Instead, it highlights that technology is not ready-made, but shaped by humans situated in a 
network of relations and artifacts. Conceptualizing the relations between organization and technology through 
sociomaterial assemblages denotes that material agency and human agency are saturating each other to the extent 
that previously taken-for-granted boundaries are dissolved (Orlikowski and Scott 2008).  
Second, we adopt the idea that materiality can be viewed as performed relations, rather than as pre-formed 
substances. While the constitutive entanglement of agency is a central element of sociomateriality, it gives poor 
guidance in understanding the role and meaning of material agency. Unlike humans, material agents are not capable 
of setting up goals that refer to non-existing future states and then seek to realize them. Still, the sociomateriality 
literature argues that we can take material agency as seriously as human agency, as long as we consider it temporally 
emergent in practice. The contours of material agency are never decisively known in advance, but have to be 
explored in practice over time (Pickering 1993). Therefore, material agency can be viewed as performed relations, 
emerging through impure dynamics that is “situated within a space of human purpose, goals, and plans” (Pickering 
1993, p. 577). 
Third, we turn to the mangle of practice (Pickering 1993) to understand how the interplay between material and 
human agency shape trajectories of change. In viewing materiality as performed relations embedded in sociomaterial 
assemblages, we have a model to understand material and human agency, as well as the interplay between th m. 
With the notion of ‘mangle’, Pickering underlines the ambiguity inherent in this dialectical dance of human and 
material agency. He argues that “the trajectories of emergence of human and material agency are constitutively 
enmeshed in practice by means of a dialectic of resistance and accommodation (emphasis is ours)” – the mangle of 
practice. Here, resistance denotes “the failure to achieve an intended capture of agency in practice”, while 
accommodation means “an active human strategy of response to resistance, which can include revisions t goals and 
intentions as well as to the material form of the machine in question to the human frame of […] social relations that 
surround it” (Pickering 1995, p.22). The metaphor of mangle conjures up “the image of the unpredictable 
transformations worked upon whatever gets fed into the old-fashioned device of the same name used to squeeze 
water out of the washing” (Pickering 1993, p. 567). At the same time, he underlines that there are aspct  of human 
agency that has no material counterpart. In arguing that humans’ ability to put intentions behind our actions is 
central to the ‘mangle’ he is breaking with the strict symmetry of actor-network theory. Our ability to set up goals 
and create models that refer to non-existing future states is central in the formation of accommodation strategies.  
The digitization of car infotainment systems through the introduction of service-based modularity into traditionally 
hardware-oriented product development is not done by coincidence. It is a deliberate attempt to change an existing 
practice, aiming for specific strategic goals. At the same time, we see rich evidence that this process is characterized 
by significant ambiguity and unpredictability. Original goals tend to be significantly translated and delineated in the 
clash with an existing sociomateriality, i.e., the component-based innovation regime. In this paper, we adopt 
sociomateriality as a lens to understand the tensions between these two innovation regimes that are involved in 
digital innovation. We argue that component-based modularity and service-oriented computing can be seen as 
distinct material agencies, formed in different social contexts. In the automotive industry, component-based 
modularity is deeply mangled with centrally controlled social practices. A pressing issue for firms engaged in digital 
innovation is how to introduce a foreign form of materiality into this existing mangling of sociomateriality.  
In pursuing the idea of digital innovation, we expand the idea of the mangle of practice by noting how one form of 
material agency subjects itself to human agencies as it competes with another form of material agency in digital 
innovation. We propose a perspective of digital innovation that builds on this threesome dance of agency. I  the 
following sections, we present a case study of two automakers, AutoInc and CarCorp, and their attempt to 
appropriate a service-oriented technology called MOST for promoting agility and flexibility in their development of 
infotainment systems. The case study will demonstrate the challenges involved in developing co-existing, multiple 
practices within the same organizations and how these challenges can be traced to materiality. 
Research Methodology 
We conducted case study research at AutoInc and CarCorp, which are manufacturing firms in the automotive 
industry that develop, produce, market, and sell cars on the global market. In distinguishing between different styles 
of researcher involvement in case study research, we were “involved researcher” rather than “outside researchers” 
Human Behavior and IT 
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(Walsham 2006). In this regard, our research was interpretive (Klein and Myers 1999; Walsham 1993) in nature and 
focused on the interplay between actors and technology over time (Langley 1999; Markus and Robey 1988).  
There were two reasons why this approach to the study of sociomaterial practices was considered useful. First, a 
sociomaterial lens requires a methodology that focuses on the activities, behaviors, and events through which actors 
interpreted the new technology over time (Langley 1999). Earlier studies of sociomateriality (see e.g., Pickering 
1995), as well as other forms of practice research (e.g., Schultze and Orlikowski 2004), have adopted this kind of 
case-near research. Second, because sociomateriality still is a relatively unexplored research topic, a revelatory case 
study (Yin 2009) can be a powerful way of illustrating the concept and its implications for IS research.  
Our data collection can be described as a two-step process. First, data was collected between 2002 and 2003, when 
the first author conducted participant observation of AutoInc’s adoption of MOST. Apart of participant observation, 
one important data source was technical specifications. This early data collection was later complemented with 7 
interviews involving key personnel from AutoInc’s MOST project. The initial study at AutoInc guided our interest 
towards tensions between technological regimes in digital innovation. Second, to explore the nature of these 
tensions, a two-year (2008-2009) intensive field study was conducted at CarCorp. It generated significant data on 
sociomaterial practices enacted in the appropriation of MOST. Our data collection at CarCorp included 27 recorded 
and transcribed semi-structured interviews, ranging between 40 minutes and 2 hours. Respondents covered diff rent 
roles at CarCorp, ranging from managers to developers, and they covered expertise such as software, architecture, 
graphical interfaces, ergonomics, design, and market. Furthermore, more than 50 work meetings at the infotainment 
department were attended. These meetings were documented by taking extensive meeting notes. We also organized 
5 thematic workshops, focusing on different architectural challenges. In addition, we studied the 30 most central 
specifications from CarCorp’s original MOST project.   
The various data sources were repeatedly read and coded with an open-ended approach to identify key thmes from 
major events, activities, and technology choices that emerged over time (Langley 1999). At a relatively early stage, 
modularity came out as a central concept in understanding digital innovation and the different contradictions 
following on the clash between technological regimes. Following Strauss and Corbin (1998), we revisited the data, 
doing selective coding, to verify observations and develop a theoretical understanding of the mangling between two 
different forms of materiality. 
MOST at AutoInc and CarCorp 
MOST as a Solution to Component-Based Modularity Concerns 
At the turn of the century, AutoInc and CarCorp became increasingly aware that the growing number of 
infotainment functions challenged established development practices that were anchored in component-based 
modularity. The hitherto loose coupling between comp nents did not fully make sense anymore, when a wide range 
of co-existing applications required the same basic resources. Speakers, displays, controls, and various sensors 
simply had to be shared over the full range of infotainment applications to support customer satisfaction and 
economy of scale. 
Following the deep-rooted logic of modularity AutoInc and CarCorp started to define groups of components to hide 
the increasing interdependence within sub-systems. While initially boosting functional growth, this stra egy soon 
turned into a burden for the automakers. With modularity being a central element in enforcing hierarchical control 
over suppliers and sub-contractors, CarCorp and AutoInc largely found themselves being in the hands of the 
suppliers. Amplifiers, radios, CD players, etc, remained separate physical entities, but highly intertwined through 
various proprietary and largely unknown networks, protocols, and harnesses from a few major suppliers. At both 
firms, R&D staff perceived decreasing control of system design, product planners of upcoming functional ty, and 
purchasers of the sourcing process. The rapidly increasing coupling simply had to be addressed in a new way to 
reclaim control and secure future growth. At the turn of the century one industry-wide initiative had chieved 
enough momentum to be hailed as a solution to these problems: MOST. A senior AutoInc systems architect r all 
the early discussions promoting MOST as an interesting general purpose network concept, supporting the domain 
specific requirements and thereby further growth: 
We all saw the transformation of infotainment. It was a remarkable change, and growth, and new 
lifecycles of the products. We needed an infrastructu e to support this. MOST was [already] selected by 
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BMW, with others talking about it. Somehow it should support this domain, with needs beyond body 
[electronics] and powertrain.  
The adoption of MOST was preceded by investigations a d debates at the two auto manufacturers. At AutoInc an 
official pre-study was launched, in the form of an dvanced engineering project. CarCorp adopted a less formal 
approach, evaluating the technology on the basis of a technology review. Overall, at both companies three different 
perspectives emerged from the process; MOST as architecture, MOST as standard, and MOST as a business driver. 
MOST as Architecture 
In the mid 90th AutoInc and CarCorp successfully established the controller-area network (CAN) as an in-vehicle 
communication backbone. A wide range of artifacts (sensors, actuators, computing, etc) were now interconnected 
via this dual wire serial bus. However, with its relatively low bandwidth, the CAN network quickly became a 
limiting resource. The growing number of infotainment components, requesting network capacity for audio, 
graphics, video and human-machine interaction (HMI), could not benefit from the CAN concept. Instead vrious ad 
hoc solutions emerged, often designed by suppliers for a specific purpose or project. With a growing number of 
suppliers and components the overall system solution became inherently complex and hard to manage. The various 
sub-systems simply did not fit well together. 
The technology reviews suggested that MOST offered p omising solutions for the almost desperate need of structure 
and reduced complexity. A technical fellow and later acting project manager for AutoInc' MOST project explain the 
motives: 
It was all about bringing things together. To get control [data], signals, audio, and, as we expected, 
also video into the same bus concept. This in contrast to a mess of different harnesses and cables. It 
would have simplified the system dramatically, as with a computer you are plugging into the wall. You 
don’t have one network for control signals, one forstreaming audio, and one for streaming video. 
You’ve got ONE Ethernet connector.  
Another consequence of the heterogeneous, supplier driven architecture was its inability to support change and 
modifications. Component changes often brought costly and time-consuming system level modifications. Therefore, 
systems architects identified flexibility and modularity as important primitives of an upcoming infotainment 
architecture. A senior AutoInc architect reflects back on the arguments at the time: 
It [MOST] will come [on the market], and we need to approach it, prepare ourselves in order to get 
access to such flexibility – that is probably an interesting concept here – to be able to produce 
information anywhere in the car and consume it somewhere else, in a simple way.  
A third architectural motive presented in favor of MOST was capacity. In extrapolating the functional growth of the 
90th, bandwidth was standing out as a critical issue. CarCorp's former MOST project manager recalls that: 
We had remarkable ambitions. We planned for video screens in the back seat and support for external 
video sources, delivering services such as park assist nce. It should be a pretty high level of 
functionality. And when we looked at the different things customers should be able to do concurrently – 
it was a concept work I guess – we found that CAN wouldn’t do. We needed a really powerful bus 
concept to survive that. It should be able to support graphics, while simultaneously transmitting a burst 
of navigation data. 
MOST as a Standard 
The work of the industry-spanning MOST consortium ai ed for standardized technology, from the lowest physical 
layers all the way up to the application layers. Dedicated hardware, middleware for network management and an 
extensive application framework  should secure a comm n – and thereby compatible – approach to vehicle 
infotainment. Considering a reflection from the acting AutoInc MOST project manager, it is clear that 
standardization was an important argument in promoting MOST:  
This idea about common specifications on functions and interfaces, that’s a major benefit. More or less 
being able to buy a component [off the shelf], likea radio tuner, developed for one manufacturer, but 
applicable to another since it’s a common interface sp cification.  
Human Behavior and IT 
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Significant adoption of a standardized technology was considered a great potential, not least in the sourcing process. 
With the traditional, proprietary system solutions CarCorp and AutoInc could possibly benefit from competition at 
the time of sourcing, but not over the product lifecycle. Major investments in systems integration effectively 
prevented re-sourcing of components, causing lock-in effects where the manufacturer had no option but to s ick with 
existing suppliers. With standardized components CarCorp and AutoInc saw a potential to dramatically increase 
competition, with lower thresholds for re-sourcing. 
MOST as a Business Driver 
The third perspective falling out of the technology reviews referred to MOST’s ability to transform business in 
scope and form. The inherent ability to support servic  orientation played a minor role in this discussion. Instead of 
seeing software in itself as a potential revenue generator, this stream of proponents suggested that MOST would 
allow modern, distributed software development to fit into the established paradigm of component-based 
modularity. Together, the generic fiber-optical bus and the object-oriented, event-driven application framework were 
expected to give a healthy separation between hardware and software. Suddenly, it was possible to see th  
increasingly problematic issue of integration through the lens of software, rather than costly and inflexible hardware 
structures.  
With frustration CarCorp and AutoInc’s product planners had observed how these increasingly monolithic hardware 
structures destroyed attractive business models. Instead of an open option list model, enabling customer unique 
combinations, these interdependent systems forced th  auto makers to bundle functionality in a few predefined 
offerings. In addition, such solutions complicated he lucrative aftermarket business. With tight, physical integration 
between components, it was more or less impossible to extend or change the configuration over the vehicl ’s life 
cycle. It was argued that MOST would break up the monoliths, allowing unlimited variations in functionality 
through a wide range of specialized, independent components.   
In summary, this perspective suggested that the MOST concept could be applied as to support the traditional 
component-based modularity. Extensive bandwidth, highly specialized and independent components, and software 
enabled functionality would secure future growth and diversity for infotainment functions, both as options (built-in 
at the time of production) and accessories (aftermarket extension). 
Adopting MOST 
With the decisions to adopt MOST as the new infotainment backbone CarCorp and AutoInc entered a rather painful 
path, unfolding in the clash of technological paradigms. A potentially service-oriented approach – characterized by a 
combination of extensive, generic communication capa ity and object-oriented, event-driven computing – was about 
to be applied in a domain based on component-based modularity. The materiality of digital, software-based product 
development was confronted with solid materiality of hardware-centric structures, which is deeply ingrained into the 
very sociotechnical fabric of the existing organizations and products. As illustrated by AutoInc’s project manager, 
the new technology brought a wide range of challenges, from technology design to processes and organizations. 
We had no idea what we were about to engage in… We simply bit off more than we could chew. First, 
introducing a new bus [concept], then taking system responsibility – previously allocated to an 
external supplier – and, finally, making it a lot more complex through distribution. It was a major 
challenge. 
As these various challenges unfolded, the automakers initiated a range of actions. First, they had to acquire and 
develop new knowledge. Second, the designers found existing design hierarchies suboptimal in supporting the new 
technology. Therefore, as they developed basic knowledge, their attention was gradually shifted toward the 
establishment of new forms for collaboration within their own organization and towards suppliers. Finally, with 
many critical tensions resolved, CarCorp and AutoInc started to set up new design practices for MOST-based 
infotainment. 
Developing New Knowledge 
The MOST concept brought several new technologies with impact on component design. For example, the novel 
integrated circuits that enables access to the optical network were not yet stable, thus causing major trouble to both 
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manufacturers. Although learning how to manage fiber optics in an automotive context was demanding, the critical 
challenges were related to architectural design, rathe  than component design. With MOST, the notion of 
architecture became blurred to designers, and gradually loaded with new meaning. The traditional rationale behind 
architectural work – hiding complexity, division oflabor, reuse, etc – was extended with a new, partly incompatible 
logic. With software-based functionality distributed over several physical components, other properties b came 
salient. The new infotainment architecture became an nabler of functionality, largely defining the shape and form 
of this distributed computing environment. Systems architects turned into platform designers. The archite ture came 
to manifest a design philosophy and generic system level services, rather than the structure of components. Although 
this transition was highlighted in the original MOST concept, the auto makers underestimated the challenges of 
discovering, understanding, and implementing this de ign philosophy. A senior systems architect at CarCorp 
remembers his disappointment, when discovering that the architectural concept was far from solid: 
They [MOST cooperation] promoted MOST as a new system-level model, a new kind of thinking, a new 
philosophy for design. But this model was never written down. It was BMW and Becker running it, but 
not in public. […] we could see how it was designed, I mean the result of the MOST interface definitio, 
but we never understood the [deeper] thinking, and how they intended to evolve it. That made many of 
us, implementing at the time, doing extensions of our own, tweaking around, and creating solutions 
which probably did not align with the visions.  
 On a general level, systems architects and designer  w re trapped between two different materialities. On the one 
hand, they had to adopt a more service-oriented appro ch to infotainment development. There was a consensus 
among engineers that the established component-based modularity would not be able to secure future growth for this 
family of increasingly changing applications. On the other hand, they were still embedded in a product evelopment 
context that is tightly entangled with hardware-centric component-based modularity. A massive body of existing 
requirements was derived on the premises of this sociomateriality of component-based modularity. Furthe , both 
suppliers and the auto makers’ own purchasing were r luctant to adopt software-driven business models. So were 
the product planners, showing marginal interest in oftware as a future revenue generator. With such a range of path-
dependent forces, the lack of clear and unambiguous design vision became highly problematic. Architectural 
knowledge and new practices materialized with a bottoms-up logic, driven by designers’ local problems and 
challenges, rather than top-down, guided by strategic management. One such driver was an increasing awareness 
that existing processes gave limited support to the emergent forms of collaboration between different ac ors in 
existing design hierarchies. 
Seeking New Forms for Collaboration 
The automotive industry’s component-based modularity, refined over a hundred years, is essentially tightly 
intertwined with strict hierarchies both in product and organization structures. Product structures ar hierarchical, 
with horizontal independency between components. In the same way, organizations are hierarchical, dividing 
relatively independent branches of labor. In order to manage such design hierarchies CarCorp and AutoInc f llowed 
strictly linear innovation processes, with a dynamics powered by waterfall models (Boehm 1976; Royce 1970) of 
product development. In practice, requirements were gradually broken down alongside the design hierarchy, 
reflecting a distributed nature of innovation. Business objectives, general system topics, and overall functional 
properties were managed by the manufacturers, while t e design of components and detailed functionality was 
assigned to highly autonomous suppliers, further down the hierarchy.  
With the introduction of MOST, it soon became obvious that these remote “islands of innovation” did not perform 
anymore. Still being trapped in hardware-centric sociomateriality, functionality spanned several physical 
components and, thereby, suppliers. The automakers saw no other option than bridging the gap between suppliers 
themselves by specifying not only interfaces between components, but also the system level behavior of component-
spanning functions. As illustrated by a project manager at CarCorp, this approach had significant implications for 
the collaboration within established hierarchies: 
You are taking a [new] responsibility as a manufacturer, when specifying this stuff. It becomes… I 
mean, they [suppliers] CANNOT even do anything! When I think about it, it’s not them rejecting 
responsibility, it’s us taking it from them. Yes, that’s what it is. We are telling them that “the only thing 
you’re about to do is to support this [our solution].[…] Earlier, when things were more component-
oriented, they had an opinion of their own on things, they had tested it – possibly with other 
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manufacturers – and knew what was good and what was bad. With this approach [MOST] we more or 
less lost such feedback.  
These problems were grounded in an emerging and fundamental mismatch between the existing social structu es and 
the emerging materiality of service-based modularity. That is, as engineers try to follow service-based modularity, 
they had to increasingly background the physical hardw re, while focusing on software-enabled functionality that 
span several components. At the same time, the sameengineers remained organized according to the component-
based modularity.  
Knowing that this mismatch could not be easily resolved, the two auto makers initiated two different measures to 
smooth the implementation of a MOST-based infotainme t solution. First, they reorganized the workforces at a local 
level to meet the new commission. At AutoInc infotainment managers decided to replace the two existing 
component subunits with four new units. In the original organization, audio components were allocated to one 
subunit, while telematics, navigation and telephony were handled by the other. The management realized that the 
conception of component was less important with the new technology and architecture. Therefore, in the new 
structure, an increased need for system level control was met by a new subunit, responsible for system and 
functional design. This subunit hosted existing roles, as well as new ones. For example, an entirely nw role – 
labeled “infotainment complete” – was created to manage a growing number of generic services, such as resource 
management and application coordination. The other new unit was created in response to the increasingly 
challenging task of testing. Distributing functionality over various components not only increased the complexity in 
interfaces among components, complicating integration, but also redefined the meaning of component testing. 
Behavior of functions could no longer be validated on a component level, leaving this task to the system  owner – 
the manufacturer.    
Although CarCorp did not implement AutoInc's formal change of the organization, they also went through very 
similar experiences, albeit somewhat informally. The acting project manager for MOST industrialization reflected 
on this topic: 
Originally, it was a component-oriented group. They were expected to work with functional 
specifications as well. Later on, this didn’t work out, so they invited some people working with functio s 
only. They needed more and more such people and, eventually they were a group of their own. Probably 
10-12 [persons], maybe even more. Most of them were consultant since it was running so fast, and we 
wanted it implemented. We underestimated the efforts significantly 
Taken together, rather than obliterating the hierarchical structure, the two manufacturers rebalanced th  workforce, 
with old roles and levels of the hierarchy essentially remaining the same, while the locus of design activities moved 
upwards in the hierarchy, from the component level to the functional level. 
Second, designers needed to break with the strictly linear models of innovation. The new situation pushed new 
forms for collaboration and new relations – some temporary and some more permanent – between actors that were 
not supported by the official hierarchy. Moreover, with functionality becoming a system-level issue, it was 
necessary to adopt iterative approaches to innovations. While the official development processes stated v ry few 
recursions, each resulting in the production of a pre-series car, the new way of designing infotainment s emed to call 
for an endless series of iterations. While the reorganization was formally approved by management, solutions to 
these challenges emerged bottom-up, from designers’ daily need to make progress in the development process. 
When specifications were ambiguous to suppliers, workshops were initiated with relevant stakeholders. When 
supplier implementations failed due to various misconceptions, the automakers built extensive system-level test 
environments to identify and solve problems collectively. When progress was too slow, the number of iterations 
increased dramatically, sometimes exceeding one software release a week. Such figures are in stark contrast to the 
official development process, stating just a handful o  releases for an entire 3-4 year car project. 
The introduction of service-based modularity led to the emergence of a mixed form of sociomateriality. On the one 
hand, traditional sociomateriality based on hierarchies and component-based modularity remained. Formal 
specifications were written, broken down to a component level and, eventually, sourced to various suppliers 
according to existing principles. On the other hand, much of the critical work was performed in a fluid structure of 
more or less temporary, cross-organizational design teams. Relations between actors and arenas for collaboration 
were established and destroyed according to project needs. Together these informal teams and processes made up a 
network-based model for innovation, augmented to the formal hierarchy.  
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Balancing these two, partly incompatible sociomateri lities was highly challenging to designers and architects. To 
support the network-oriented daily work, the auto makers had to create new design practices, improving the 
collaborative visibility. At the same time, to enforce the formal hierarchies they had to find new practices for the 
deployment of the growing functional designs to physical components.  
Setting up New Design Practices 
Systems architects at CarCorp and AutoInc had studied new design practices from the software industry even before 
the introduction of MOST. Since they had already seen increasing interdependencies with the low bandwidth CAN 
networks, they were attracted by the ideas behind service-based modularity design and the ontological separation 
between software and hardware. With the decision to ad pt MOST technology, bringing object-orientation a d 
event-driven design, such ideas became legitimate and apparently useful.  
First, the two auto makers revised their definitions of architecture. In the architecture specification f r the new 
infotainment system, CarCorp developed the notion of components, now referring to them as either logical entities 
or physical nodes. On the basis of this extended notio , they defined architecture “as the structures of the 
components of the system, their interrelationships, and principles and guidelines governing the design and evolution 
over time”. In contrast to prior architectural approaches which more or less addressed the decomposition of systems 
in independent parts, this definition significantly changed the locus of architectural work. In including the dynamics 
of interconnected components and principles for development, it made system architecture a matter for designers in 
their daily work. 
Second, with the logical view of system design in place, both CarCorp and AutoInc adopted new CASE tools 
supporting a model-based approach to system design. Both firms decided to use the unified modeling language 
(UML) as a basis for modeling. However, while CarCorp focused on the cognitive challenges, using Microsoft Visio 
to capture, describe and illustrate the complex system, AutoInc wanted to take modeling one step further. They 
adopted the more extensive Rose Suite from Rational in order to get better support for the deployment of logical 
designs on physical components. This tool enabled AutoInc to generate component level specifications and interface 
specifications automatically from the logical designs. Consequently, the role of component engineers transformed 
radically. Their prior role, interpreting information and compiling specifications, was essentially reduced to editorial 
work, including various non-functional requirements. Therefore, AutoInc’s approach to modeling supported not only 
the cognitive aspects of system design, but also the more organizational challenges of rebalancing the workforces.  
Finally, the two manufacturers spent considerable tim  and energy in trying to establish and spread various design 
patterns (cf. Gamma et al. 1995) across the formal and informal organization structures. One such key strategy was 
founded on the architectural pattern model-view-control (MVC). Here the logical model objects corresponded to 
basic functionality, such as navigation routing or digital music decoding. View objects implemented the user 
interface, while control captured the dynamic properties. Along with this central idea, both auto-makers 
implemented the observer pattern (sometimes labeled publisher-subscriber) to facilitate event-driven interaction 
between an increasing amount of distributed objects. Basically, this pattern identified controllers and views as 
subscribers of events at the models, creating a hierarchy between objects. As described by CarCorp in its 
architecture and design strategy, these approaches aimed for an important isolation between user interface issues and 
basic functional issues: 
The infotainment system is a user interactive and user intensive system (application) with continuously 
changes in the user interface but with core functionality that in some degree is defined as stable. 
Therefore it is a good idea to split the core functionality from the user interface. 
Although resolving some major issues of complexity and reuse of generic functionality, this approach created new 
challenges at the time of deployment. The formal hierarchies preserved the physical component as the central unit of 
design, manufacturing and sourcing. With a service-ori nted business model beyond reach, the auto makers saw no 
option but to deploy the model objects on various remote components, while view and control objects were allocated 
to a few central components. Generic navigation or media functionality were sourced to dedicated specialists, while 
their respective user interface were centralized to co rdinate user interaction (Broström et al. 2006) and aligned 
look-and-feel. AutoInc even considered the control over user interfaces critical enough to develop the infotainment 
control module (ICM) in-house. 
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As a consequence, this deployment strategy broke more or less every function apart in two non-trivial units, 
boosting distribution one step further. The system became highly interactive in terms of network communication, 
causing major system level problems with latency, timing, etc. Most of the problem seemed to derive from the 
boundaries raised at deployment. Suppliers simply did not understand each other and made different interpretations 
of the same information. 
Consequences 
Over a rather painful period of approximately 2 years, CarCorp and AutoInc revised their architectural knowledge, 
established new forms for collaboration and launched n w design practices. These initiatives had significant impact 
on the three dimensions of MOST as architecture, standard, and business drive. 
First, the MOST architecture significantly challengd and transformed the existing architectural approach at 
CarCorp and AutoInc. It established the logical view on systems design, releasing significant power of software, 
until then bounded to independent physical components. It changed the rationale behind architecting, making 
platform designers out of architects. 
Second, and perhaps most obvious, the idea of MOST as a standard faded away as soon as the designers were 
squeezed between an immature concept and established designs. Extremely tight project schedules did not leave the 
option of taking problems back to the MOST cooperation for reconsideration. Instead, CarCorp, AutoInc a d most 
other auto makers implemented proprietary solutions  top of the core MOST concept. Off-the-shelf comp nents 
did not emerge at the time of the first MOST projects, nor later. 
Finally, with MOST as a business driver, the outcome is somewhat more subtle and ambiguous. The new 
infotainment systems became a lot more distributed, in sense of physical components with dedicated functio s. 
These remote components were definitely less interconnected physically, more or less only reliant on pwer supply 
and a fiber optical cable. However, logically they were highly interdependent with a few central components, 
managing system properties and user interfaces. Although slightly increasing the configurability at the time of car 
sale, this rather centralized solution effectively r strained the anticipated after-market business.  
Discussion 
In this paper, we seek to understand the mangle of two different forms of materiality with human agencies during 
the digital innovation process. Specifically, we examine how the existing sociomateriality established with the 
materiality of hardware-centric component-based modularity respond to the designers’ attempts to introduce a new 
form of materiality, based on software-centric service-based modularity. Consistent with the core concept of 
sociomateriality, our case study shows that technological change cannot be foreseen or understood unless s eing 
technology and social structures as a whole. Althoug  MOST in itself has every hallmark of a truly service-oriented 
technology, it did not feed a service-oriented infotainment business for CarCorp or AutoInc. Social structures of 
these two organizations are deeply entangled with the materiality of component-based modularity. The established 
sociomateriality resisted engineers’ efforts to introduce service-oriented modularity. Consequently, engineers had to 
accommodate the principles of MOST evolved through a continuous compromise and adaptations of materiali y, 
creation of new design practices, and establishment of new social structures. This mangling process led to the 
hybridization of materiality, reflecting both existing, familiar practices and the selective elements of MOST 
technology. As a technology, the new MOST concept bcame local, rather than global over the entire organization, 
and had to emerge in some harmony with existing sociomaterial practices, rather than replacing them. Although 
infotainment is a high profile application area visible to end-users, it makes only a minor element of a car. In such an 
embedded context, designers may seek software-centric architectures that can improve system performance or the 
execution of a local application's functions – protoc ls, signal processing, user interface, and so on – but only while 
meeting all performance and resource requirements (space, weight, power consumption, electromagnetic 
compatibility, etc) of the overall system (Wolf 2002). Essentially, these non-functional requirements are defined by 
the existing physical materiality of hardware. 
This tension between a hardware-centric, physical materiality and an emerging software-centric digital materiality is 
present throughout the entire process of adopting and appropriating MOST. Indeed, there are frequent elem nts of 
gradual learning and dialogue in our case story. Still, as exemplified by table 1, almost any central decision can be 
traced to a series of mangle of two forms of materility and human agency in the form of resistance and
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accommodations, playing out at three different layers in product development: architecture, design, and 
organization. First, MOST introduced a radically different approach to architecture, focusing on the structures of 
software-based logical elements, rather than physical components. The traditional architectural approach, grounded 
in component-based modularity, aimed for decomposition of the product in a hierarchy of relatively independent 
modules. This enabled the automakers to exercise control over the product through strict supervision of the 
interfaces. At the same time, it encouraged innovati n by allowing for extensive autonomy within components. In 
contrast, the new architectural concept, grounded in service-oriented modularity, aimed for a decoupling between 
software structures and hardware structures. It promised a functional design practice without strict encapsulation in 
components. CarCorp and AutoInc would be able to exercise control by taking a more active role in logical design, 
although leaving physical design to tier-1 suppliers. It was also expected to encourage architectural innovation by 
giving the designers access to heterogeneous resources over the entire system. The main challenge, also making a 
significant force of resistance, turned out to be th  act of deployment. With component-based modularity remaining 
the dominant architectural model for vehicle design in general, it kept making a template for supplier relations also 
in the area of infotainment. Given that suppliers were contracted to deliver physical components, not software, 
engineers feared that the new concept would bring a counterproductive separation of distributed functions, for 
implementation by different suppliers, at the level of components. To preserve reasonable agility promised by the 
logical architecture, the automakers accommodated this resistance through a platform approach to archite tural 
design. The system, as a whole, was designed to enable generic, non-functional services, such as servic  d scovery, 
resource management or application coordination. While accessible over the entire system, these central elements 
were allocated by architects to one (AutoInc) or two (CarCorp) strategic components, under extensive control by the 
auto makers. Although software implementation essentially remained a task for component suppliers, this platform 
concept allowed the manufacturers to easily reallocte functions across components. 
Second, with the platform philosophy in place, the challenge of balancing digital dimension with physical was 
shifted to the level of design practice. With a traditional, component-based innovation paradigm, designers are 
trained to keep the interdependency between component low. Therefore, a superior objective is to establish local 
encapsulation of functionality at the level of components. However, service-orientation encourages design rs to 
build distributed functionality, allocated across components. With this architectural approach, they can take a 
system-level perspective on design, where allocation is guided by the need for simplicity, performance, information, 
etc. While systems architects met resistance in the act of deployment, the designers saw a related, potentially 
massive problem in the transition towards a logical design practice. Relying on deep-rooted organization l 
structures, where suppliers are contracted to build components, not software, they predicted a severe cognitive 
challenge. Essentially, this resistance developed in the fear that coherent system-level designs were running the risk 
of being broken apart in abstract pieces, more or less incomprehensible on a component level. Addressing uch 
misgivings, CarCorp and AutoInc accommodated by introducing model-based design methodology, supported by 
new CASE tools. They also launched several new design patterns to guide designers in their modeling work. In 
addition to their normative effects on practice, these efforts injected invaluable insights across the entire design 
hierarchy, giving all actors a better understanding of the interrelations between system-level designs and component-
level implementations. 
Finally, the transformation of architectures and design practices highlighted that the experienced resistances derived 
from a mismatch between organizational structures and the emerging product structures. Essentially, the 
established, component-based innovation regime is built on the concept of hierarchy, where entities on the same 
level of aggregation are largely independent. At the same time a component has a well defined fit into the next level 
of aggregation. Over the years it has proven highly efficient to reflect this structure also in the organization. 
Therefore, manufacturing firms tend to feed innovations linearly through a vertical hierarchy. A service-oriented 
innovation regime, on the other hand, put technological change and organizational agility in focus, rather than 
specialization, expertise, and division of labor. Through loosely connected networks of internal and external 
contributors it offers the manufacturing firm a non-linear innovation model, better suited for the exploitation of 
heterogeneity and multiplicity across horizontal layers.  While engineers had more or less unrestricted authority over 
the local infotainment architecture, they were not able change the organizational structures. Sourcing was a matter 
for central purchasing departments, and business models were centered on the idea of selling components. Trying to 
establish a radically new organization, applicable to the local domain of infotainment was not only impractical, but 
virtually hopeless. Accommodating this resistance, th  infotainment managers decided to rebalance their own formal 
organization, instead of breaking it up. While roles and hierarchy structure essentially remained untouched, the locus 
of design activity moved upwards in the hierarchy. As CarCorp and AutoInc got more involved in system-l vel 
designs, resources were transferred from the component level to the functional level. In addition to such top-down 
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initiatives, launched by management, designers built informal innovation networks, augmented to the formal 
organizations. These bottoms-up initiatives emerged as a response to their need to reach beyond the local
organization. Unable to reform supplier organizations, they simply enforced a new, organization-spanning design 
practice, where engineers from different organizations worked together, side by side. 
Table 1. Resistance and accommodation in the mangling of sociomaterial practice at CarCorp and AutoInc. 
 Logic of the established 
sociomateriality 









e With traditional, physical 
architectures, based on 
component-based 
modularity, CarCorp and 
AutoInc are able to 
exercise product control 
through strict 
supervision of the 
interfaces. It also 
encourages component 
innovation by allowing 
for extensive autonomy 
at the level of suppliers. 
A logical architecture, 
based on service-oriented 
modularity, invites the 
automakers to exercise 
control by taking a more 
active role in logical 
design. It also 
encourages architectural 
innovation by giving the 
designer access to 
heterogeneous resources 
across the system. 
The emerging logical 
architecture met 
significant resistance in 
the act of decomposition. 
Architects feared that the 
agility would be lost as 
logical designs were 
decomposed to fit a 
traditional physical 
architecture, with several 
components, delivered by 
different suppliers. 
 
To preserve agility, 
while still avoiding 
functional fragmentation, 
the automakers 
introduced a platform 




etc, the platform enabled 






n Design practices 






functional designers tend 
to strive for local 
encapsulation at the level 
of components. 
Design practices 




of functionality, across 
components. In doing so, 
it opens up for a system-
level perspective on 
design, where allocation 
is guided by the need for 
simplicity, performance, 
information, etc.  
The emerging design 
practice was resisted in 
that designers envisioned 
massive cognitive 
difficulties, across design 
hierarchies. They feared 
that coherent system-
level designs would be 
broken apart in abstract 
pieces, more or less 
incomprehensible on a 
component level. 
 
To resolve some of the 
cognitive problems, yet 
adopting a system-level, 
logical design practice, 
the automakers 
introduced model-based 
design principles and 
generic design patterns. 
These tools gave a 
common overview and 
valuable insights across 
the organization-







n A hierarchical 
organization structure 
enables a linear model of 
innovation, where 
information flows 
vertically. This allows 
for specialization and 
division of labor, being 
critical factors in a 
component-based 





rather than specialization 
and expertise. Such 
loosely connected 
networks of internal and 
external contributors 
allow for non-linear 
innovation models, able 
to cater for heterogeneity 
and multiplicity across 
horizontal layers. 
The networked 
organization was resisted 
in that local infotainment 
needs clashed with firm-
level organizational 
strategies. Infotainment 
managers had extensive 
authority over 
technology, but little 
influence on purchasing 
or business strategies, 
tuned for component-
based innovation. 




launched a rebalancing 
of the local organization. 
In addition, designers 
built informal innovation 
networks, augmented to 




The resistances of physical materiality of component-based modularity at each layer are central in developing new 
sociomaterial practices, embracing selective elements of digital materiality of service-based modularity. Although 
designers are constrained by the established sociomateriality that limits their design options, they actively and 
artfully exploit accommodate these resistance in order to seek alternative sociomateriality. Therefore, th  threesome 
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dance of agency – the mangle of sociomaterial practice among digital and physical materiality and human agency of 
engineers – is the central force that fuels the digital innovation of infotainment at both CarCorp and AutoInc. 
Indeed, design practices changed with MOST, but what did this threesome dance of agency in the mangle of 
sociomateriality mean to digital innovation? First, we can establish that the local MOST architecture did not 
obliterate any architectural knowledge across the global organizations. Component-based modularity remained the 
dominant sociomateriality in the overall design of cars. Although making use of remote sensors and data, MOST did 
not generate architectural innovations at this level. However, the new concept did radically change the domain of 
infotainment, forming new sociomateriality locally. Designers and architects were given a wide range of new tools 
supporting innovation, resulting in novel HMI solutions and extensive alignment and coordination betwen 
functions. At the same time, the potential power of MOST was never fully utilized, since the hierarchical 
organizations remained. In practice, the locus of design was moved upwards in the hierarchy from the component 
level to the functional level. Ironically, innovation ended up in the hands of fewer people, not more. Fostered in a 
component-based innovation paradigm, where control is a central aspect of architectural ideas, they exploited the 
logical perspective for centralization, rather than multiplicity. Finally, our study suggests that modular innovation 
that was traditionally performed by suppliers was ob tructed by the new MOST concept. With suppliers becoming 
less independent, they took a more passive role in innovation, leaving more of the design work for theauto makers. 
Our study has two important implications for the us of sociomateriality in digital innovation. First, as we pointed 
out, hardware-centric component-based modularity and software-centric service-based modularity represent two 
different forms of materiality. In studying digital innovations, where a key challenge is to merge digital components 
with physical components, researchers must carefully separate differences in physical and digital materi lity 
(Leonardi 2007, Leonardi and Barley 2008). As earlir studies of sociomateriality often focus on a single 
technological innovation, thus directing the attentio  to the interplay between material agency of a single technology 
and human agency, this suggests a rather significant theoretical extension to the existing sociomaterility works. 
Second, our study also suggests a possible third element in the dynamics of mangle in the context of digital 
innovations. In our study, while the physical material agency of component-based modularity resisted th  human 
agency of designers who wanted to introduce MOST, the digital material agency of service-based modularity 
subjected itself to human agency, becoming a part of accommodation strategy. This threesome dance of agency 
among physical materiality, digital materiality and human agency through resistance, subjection and accommodation 
seems to be a fundamental mechanism in the evolution of digital innovations.  
Finally, a sociomateriality perspective suggests that e contours of digital innovations are temporarily emergent. It 
is never fully known ahead of time, only situated in response to human purpose, goals, plans and actions through 
resistance. As Pickering notes, resistance is liminal, existing at the boundary – always open and becoming. 
Similarly, a sociomateriality perspective also suggests that the contours of human agency in digital innovation are 
equally emergent and tentative. To quote Pickering (1993), “[n]o one could have foreseen in advance that is 
transformation would come about; no identifiable features of [innovator’s] initial situation determines it. 
[Innovators] did not intent it at all. […] The social evolution of [innovator’s work practice] itself was constitutively 
the product of maneuvers in the field of material agency” (p. 581)1. In this case, it is the maneuvers in the fields of 
two material agencies: physical and digital.  
Conclusions 
Digitalization and converging digital technologies have changed the innovation landscape in many industries. 
Generic platforms and dramatically reduced communication costs allow for integration of previously unco nected 
activities and artifacts (Yoo et al. 2008), opening a new source of creativity at the level of product designers. In 
contrast to many other areas, traditional product developing industries have not been particularly successful in 
conquering these architectural dimensions of digitization. Our study suggests that the threesome dance mong 
physical material agency, digital material agency and human agency is an important aspect in explaining how 
embedded IT emerges in manufacturing. Digital archite tures have to materialize in harmony with existing regimes, 
rather than replacing them. Essentially, the evoluti n of digital technologies in manufacturing is a result of a mangle 
of sociomaterial practices, resolving various resistance, subjection and accommodation among physical and digital 
materiality and human agency.  
                                                      
1 In his original writing, instead of innovator, Pickering was referring to Glaser who invented bubble chamber. 
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